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ABSTRACT: The encounter of Bolshevik 
leaders and militants with Mexico 
during the 1920s was determined by 
the vagaries and evolvement of both 
revolutions. What appeared initially 
as a possible reinforcement of the 
revolutionary potential of both in a 
world engulfed in interstate conflicts 
and imperial domination, turned 
by necessity and ideology into the 
national and nationalist preservation 
of sovereignty, subordinating that 
revolutionary potential to the 
strengthening of the state.
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RESUMO: O encontro dos líderes 
e militantes bolcheviques com o 
México, durante a década de 1920, 
foi determinado pelos imprevistos e 
evolução de ambas as revoluções. O que 
parecia inicialmente como um possível 
reforço do seu potencial revolucionário 
num mundo envolvido em conflitos 
interestatais e dominação imperial, 
transformou-se por necessidade e 
ideologia em preservação nacional e 
nacionalista da soberania, subordinando 
aquele potencial revolucionário ao 
fortalecimento do estado.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In February of 1918, the agrarian leader from the Mexican state 
of Morelos, Emiliano Zapata, wrote to his friend, Genaro Amezcua:
We would gain a lot, human justice would 
gain a lot, if all the peoples of our America 
and all the nations of old Europe were to 
understand that the cause of Revolutionary 
Mexico and the cause of Russia are and rep-
resent the cause of humanity, the supreme in-
terest of all the oppressed peoples. (BARTRA, 
1986, p. 320)
Zapata perceived “the visible analogy, the pronounced parallelism, 
the absolute parity, to put it better, that exists between the Russian 
movement and the agrarian revolution in Mexico” (Bartra, 1986, p. 
320). To Zapata and others the Bolshevik revolution was attractive 
because it seemed to offer the same intense feeling of community 
which was at the core of their struggles. The anarchist Ricardo Flores 
Magón in March 1918 described the Russian revolution as:
a movement that has to spark, whether those 
ingratiated with the current system of exploi-
tation and crime like it or not, the great world 
revolution that is now knocking on the gates 
of all the peoples; the great world revolution 
that will introduce important changes in the 
way in which human beings live with one an-
other. (BARTRA, 1986, p. 321).
Indeed, in 1918 labor organizations, artisans, and intellectuals 
of the city and the countryside, without knowing the details saw 
the Bolshevik Revolution as having the same goals as the Mexican. 
For the libertarians and agraristas, the soviets or workers’ councils 
exemplified direct action, individual freedom, and the destruction 
of the bourgeois state. 
However, in the process the trajectory of the Bolshevik revo-
lution took roads different from what its admirers had anticipat-
ed. The Mexican anarchists and the Zapatistas became wary of 
the Bolshevik position in relation to the role of the state, work-
ers’ democracy and land reform, understood as the right of those 
who till the soil to have land. For the anarchists, the revolution 
turned into tragedy; for Flores Magón, the dictatorship of the party 
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became a tyranny and the economic measures of radical commu-
nism, whereby food was taken by force from the countryside, and 
taken to the cities to feed the urban population, and the disman-
tling in one sweep of the market, did not bring either freedom or 
well-being. In 1921 Flores Magón, then lingering in jail in Missouri 
for his radical activities in the United States, no longer saw any 
future in Bolshevism. He foresaw that: “The collapse of Lenin and 
Trotsky’s dictatorship is only a matter of time, and the workers of 
the world should be prepared to face that failure with serenity” 
(BARTRA, 1986, p. 322). Alongside such skepticism, other sectors 
of the Mexican society looked to the Bolshevik Revolution as a 
possible alternative to the legal rigmarole that the national revolu-
tion was becoming (BARTRA, 1986; LOMNITZ, 2014).
This article -- based on research in the Soviet archives after 
they became accessible in the 1990s, on repositories in Mexico 
and the literature that has been published since then, uses biog-
raphy as a methodological tool. It is divided into several historical 
stages, represented by three individuals who arrived in Mexico at 
particular junctures during the development of the Mexican and 
the Bolshevik revolutions during the 1920s; it accounts for what 
they did, saw, thought and felt, and what effect their experience 
might have had on their lives upon their return to the Soviet Union. 
I shall refer to Mikhail Borodin, which was the alias of Mikhail 
Gruzenberg, born in 1884 in Byelorussia and died in prison in 1951; 
to Stanislav Pestkovsky, of Polish noble origin, born in 1882 and 
vanished in 1937 during the anti-Polish purge in the Communist 
International; and to Aleksandra Kollontai, born in 1872 in St. 
Petersburg and died in 1952 in Moscow in her bed. The aim of 
the article is to examine the interaction between individuals, the 
context in which they happened to act, and how what they did and 
thought in turn shaped the milieu in which they lived. 
2 THE FIRST STAGE
After the founding of the Communist International, known 
also as the Third International, or Comintern, in March 1919 in 
Moscow, the Bolshevik leaders spread the news of its existence and 
its ideas beyond Europe with greater vehemence, determination 
Daniela SpenSer
80  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 77-98, 2016
and resources than had been expended with the expansion of the 
First and Second Internationals. The original idea of stimulating 
revolutionary struggles in Europe that would be followed by move-
ments in the rest of the world changed as a result of the failed 
attempts at revolutions in Europe, e.g., in Germany and Hungary, 
and the social turbulence in the countries that were on the periph-
ery of the capitalist system. Even though Latin America was not 
contemplated within the revolutionary horizon of the Bolsheviks 
in the first months of the revolution, it figured in Lenin’s calcula-
tions as a region that, under the yoke of US imperialism and in the 
category of countries such as China, Turkey and Persia, had awak-
ened to political life. Mexico, more than any other country in the 
hemisphere, appeared to be a favorable terrain for planting ideas 
on communism, for organizing communist parties, and adhering 
them to the International (STERN, 1990; WEINER, 1997; LAZITCH; 
DRACHKOVITCH, 1972; ELLEY, 2002).
When Lenin sent Borodin to the United States and Mexico, 
Borodin was a faithful interpreter of Lenin’s ideas. His task was to 
establish a party in the image and likeness of the Bolshevik Party: 
centralized, disciplined, and capable of serving as a national branch 
of the party of the world revolution, the Comintern. Borodin, then 
thirty-five years of age, left Moscow in April 1919 with a Mexican 
diplomatic passport under his real name, Mikhail Gruzenberg, 
which he had acquired in the chaotic situation of 1918 in Moscow 
when the office of the Mexican consulate was seized by a group of 
soldiers who removed the rubber stamps and blank passports. One 
of the passports was probably falsified to adapt it to the traveler’s 
needs. In his luggage Borodin was carrying the renowned jewels of 
the Russian imperial family that the Soviet government attempted 
to convert to cash to finance the formation of communist parties 
(AHSRE, 1919).
Thanks to a wealth of news that circulated in the United States 
on the Mexican Revolution, reported by US journalists who trav-
eled to and from Mexico, Borodin was sufficiently informed on 
recent Mexican history to the extent that he knew whom to contact 
once he arrived in the capital. There he met a group of foreign 
socialists who supplemented his lack of understanding of Mexico 
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with their own interpretations. Initially, Borodin was presented 
as the possible ambassador from Soviet Russia. When he got to 
know them better, he revealed that he was the representative of 
the Communist International.
Borodin´s objective was to initiate relations with the Mexican 
government to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia 
and at the same time look into the possibility of founding a commu-
nist party with the goal of spreading its influence throughout Latin 
America. The two objectives were not in contradiction with each 
other. Starting or enlarging minuscule trade relations, supplying 
Soviet Russia with foodstuffs and raw materials, thus fortifying it 
in the process, had practical as well as ideological significance. 
Despite the fact that the Argentinean socialists and labor move-
ment were better organized, Mexico was in the orbit of US impe-
rialism, and its workers´ proximity to the US labor movement 
and the close relations between the two had greater potential to 
become a focus of a continental revolutionary movement (ROY, 
1964; ULDRICKS, 1979; GÓMEZ, 1964; SHIPMAN, 1993).
Borodin arrived in Mexico after the First National Socialist 
Congress was held in Mexico City in August and September 1919. 
The organizers of the congress — the trade unions and groups of 
various persuasions, the anarchists among them — called upon 
the participants to join the Second International, rather than 
the Comintern, which was largely an unknown entity. Whereas 
Borodin did not succeed in establishing diplomatic relations with 
Mexico because it was locked in various disputes with the United 
States, the combination of his impressive and persuasive personal-
ity and Mexico´s hopeful but unfulfilled promises of its revolution 
led a few socialists under his influence to change the party’s name 
to the Mexican Communist Party, and it became a branch of the 
Third International. Before leaving Mexico in December, Borodin 
bestowed upon the microscopic group that he helped to create the 
pompous status of the “Latin US Bureau of the Third International” 
and it became an extension of the bureau that the Comintern had 
established in Berlin and in Amsterdam to bring the European 
communists closer to Moscow; with little regard for the opinion of 
others, he selected delegates to the Comintern´s Second Congress, 
called for July 1920 (CARR, 1992; KHEIFETS; KHEIFETS, 1994/95).
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The fragility of the Mexican Communist Party´s foundations 
notwithstanding, on his return to Moscow with several supposed 
delegates to attend the congress of the Comintern, in an era of 
boundless voluntarism and revolutionary optimism, Borodin 
carried the encouraging news that there existed possibilities for the 
growth of the communist movement in Latin America. Mexico was 
a topic of discussion during the deliberations.  It was mentioned 
by the US communist delegates Louis Fraina and John Reed, who 
had had first-hand experience of the Mexican Revolution in 1913, 
having participated in fighting alongside Pancho Villa. Fraina, who 
was one of the first to publicize Lenin and Trotsky’s works in the 
United States, talked about the political turbulence in Mexico and 
of the danger that the struggles in Latin America posed for US 
capitalism, although he minimized the complexity of the Mexican 
revolution and in the end described Mexico and Latin America as 
passive victims of the oppressor’s aggressiveness. They were said 
not to have offered resistance to US economic and political hege-
mony (BUHLE, 1995).
 Reed, on the other hand, spoke of the influence of the Mexican 
revolutionaries, who were said to have created a popular govern-
ment that was democratic, rather than proletarian, and that wanted 
to keep the wealth of Mexico for the Mexicans and tax the foreign 
capitalists. Fraina and Reed presented two different perspectives 
on Mexico, but both were encouraging in terms of the possibilities 
for developing a revolutionary movement that would be capable 
of challenging US imperialism, although they offered no details as 
to how it would develop.  These reports and opinions concern-
ing Mexico created the impression of a country with the potential 
to develop a communist movement both domestically as well as 
in the rest of Latin America. One of the self-proclaimed Mexican 
delegates, the US draft dodger Charles Phillips1, had the good 
fortune to be received by Lenin and was charmed by the Soviet 
leader. Lenin had some vague notions about Mexico, its bourgeois 
revolution and the restive peasants demanding land. Phillips wrote 
in his memoirs: 
1 Charles Phillips, alias Jesús Ramírez.
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Could he be of help? His information on the 
country was--frankly--fragmentary. He had 
not known that much of the peasant popu-
lation was Indian. Did we have any litera-
ture written in indigenous dialects? (No. The 
Indians were illiterate). Then we would have 
to recruit Indian speakers. Those Indians, he 
said, should be your number-one objective in 
the countryside. The rest of his remarks em-
phasized Mexico’s strategic location in the 
Western Hemisphere. Everything that he said 
made a contribution, and it all revealed the 
same simple, forceful logic. (PHILLIPS, 1920, 
p. 5-8). 
In September 1920, the Comintern decided to send three envoys 
to Mexico in charge of continuing the work of organizing commu-
nism initiated by Borodin in November 1919: Charles Phillips, the 
Greenwich Village Socialist, Louis Fraina, the US socialist, and Sen 
Katayama, a veteran of Christian Trade Unionism and Japanese 
Socialism. All of them made an indelible impression on Lenin 
during the Congress in Moscow. 
In sending three agents to Mexico in 1921, the Comintern 
bestowed upon the Latin American country an importance granted 
to few others and placed it in a similar rank as China and Eastern 
nations adjacent to Soviet Russia, all despite that Mexico did not 
have the same strategic location. By the time they left Mexico a year 
later, they had abandoned the idea that the project that emanated 
from the October Revolution was universal and that it could be 
adapted to whatever the national conditions might be. They learnt 
that post-revolutionary Mexico did not fit the Soviet formula that 
the working class had the capacity to lead the rest of the labor-
ing classes, with the communist party as a vanguard. For much of 
the working population, the Mexican revolution, encapsulated in 
the State and sanctioned in the 1917 Constitution, was in progress 
and harboring a promise yet to be fulfilled. In proclaiming that the 
power of the revolutionary elite emanated from the sacrifice that 
the revolution exacted for having triumphed over the old regime, 
the Comintern in effect sanctified the revolution in many layers of 
Mexican society.
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In view of the analysis that the Comintern made regarding the 
failings of its organizational work in Mexico, and the modifica-
tion of its world outlook, from envisioning the imminent collapse 
of capitalism to its survival without meaning its recovery, the 
Third International changed the tasks it assigned to the commu-
nists to bring down the economic, political and social system that 
sustained capitalism in order to take power. The tactic was called 
bolshevization and was vigorously implemented during the 1920s 
until a crisis occurred in the Soviet Union’s international relations, 
in which several countries broke ties with Moscow.  The world 
economic crisis at the end of the decade compelled the Soviet 
Union once again to change its line from coexistence to confron-
tation with the capitalist nations. The period was characterized by 
Lenin’s death, in January 1924, and Josef Stalin’s rise to promi-
nence in the party. Gradually the Comintern was transformed into 
the international arm of the Bolshevik Party and the controversies 
in the Soviet Union were transferred, albeit not mechanically, to 
the national branches of the Third International for their adop-
tion, creating long-lasting fragmentations and hostilities between 
Stalinists and Trotskists and many shades in-between.
3 THE SECOND STAGE
When in 1924 Mexico reestablished diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union,   Stanislav Pestkovsky became the ambassador 
during the day, and Comrade Andres, representing the Comintern 
for all of Latin America the rest of the time. Pestkovsky stayed 
in Mexico for two years. His revolutionary activities brought the 
displeasure of the US government, the Mexican government, and 
of Mexico’s organized labor which the government supported and 
on which it relied to keep the restive labor force in line. Pestkovsky 
was recalled in 1926 before he was expelled by the Mexican 
government.
We can only surmise regarding Stalin’s motives to agree to 
Pestkovsky´s nomination to the post of Ambassador to Mexico. Did 
the general secretary also see the strategic importance of the open-
ing of an embassy in such a close proximity to the United States, 
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or did he place a greater weight on the fact that Pestkovsky, who 
had only shortly before belonged to an opposition group consid-
ered a deviation, was better out of the way? After all, such promi-
nent Bolsheviks as Angelica Balabanova, Christian Rakovsky, 
Alexandra Kollontai, among others, were sent abroad when there 
was evidence that they were opposed to the Bolshevik party line.
Pestkovsky subscribed to the view that Mexico was a semi-
colonial country dominated by foreign capital, and still in the grips 
of the remnants of feudalism, which precluded the development 
of internally generated, autonomous, liberating social forces. 
Mexican efforts at economic rebuilding represented an unsuc-
cessful battle against imperialism, the nature of which under-
scored other struggles, including the state-Church conflict, the 
state’s battle over the control of the labor unions, the anarchists’ 
and labor’s efforts to remain independent of both, and the state’s 
program for land reform.  All these struggles, fatally subordinated 
to the forces of imperialism, would eventually be lost despite the 
fact that Mexico displayed an independent and leading role in Latin 
America in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, 
and served as an example to the rest of the continent. 
Pestkovsky, like the Comintern, believed that the Pan-American 
union, organized by the US Federation of Labor, was a tool of 
Yankee imperialism and should and could be replaced by a confed-
eration controlled by those governments and labor unions which 
shared anti-US sentiments. Pestkovsky had originally believed 
that the Mexican president would endorse his initiative, realizing 
later that the government walked a tight rope when it came to the 
United States, and would not risk US economic and military sanc-
tions (PESTKOWSKI, 1961).
Indeed, by mid-1920s the Mexican government was locked 
in a legal and political controversy with the US government and 
US property holders over who had particular rights under the 
1917 Constitution, a conflict which was perceived as a threat to 
Mexico´s sovereignty.  Whereas one segment of the labor move-
ment was held hostage to the state-sponsored labor confedera-
tion in exchange for improvements in salaries and some labor 
conditions, dispersed labor unions held on to their autonomy at 
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a cost in loss of employment at best, and of life, at worst. There 
were members of the communist party at the helm of the agrarian 
movement and communist muralists covering the walls of public 
buildings with revolutionary themes. (CARR, 1976).
Before his departure from Europe, Pestkovsky met the recently 
elected Mexican president, Plutarco Elias Calles, in Berlin. He may 
have believed that he spoke to a fellow-traveler, at least as far as 
anti-imperialism was concerned. Even though Pestkovsky encoun-
tered a cautious president, and this may have therefore tempered 
the Russian’s optimism because of the oppressive regimes govern-
ing most of the Latin US countries, the ambassador injected revo-
lutionary élan into the routine of his diplomatic work once he had 
settled in Mexico in October 1924. He believed that in some ways 
the Mexican government was a marionette of imperialism, and 
that the working class deserved his professional attention. He also 
thought, however, that the petty-bourgeois government could in 
due course be neutralized by a swelling of the rank and file, and in 
due course overthrown. 
Pestkovsky maintained a lively contact with Mexican offi-
cials, the diplomatic corp and the intelligentsia. His visible work 
was actively organizing celebrations to mark Lenin’s death, the 
Bolshevik victory and May Labor Day.  His parties at the embassy 
became the talk of the city.  He hosted the diplomatic corps, as 
well as the workers and communists. On occasion, Diego Rivera 
dropped in straight from his scaffolding, still covered with paint. 
Pestkovsky showed films and served tea afterwards.  He routinely 
invited the Mexican president, who consistently declined the invi-
tations.  The president pled that he had too much work, or that 
he had conflicting engagements, or that the invitation arrived too 
late.  Evidently, the president did not want to be seen at the Soviet 
embassy for fear of how this would be interpreted.  Other political 
leaders had no such qualms, and became regular visitors to the 
embassy, or at least visited it occasionally.  Beginning in March 
of 1925, five months after his arrival in Mexico, Pestkovsky began 
writing a diary. 
Such diaries, routinely written by Soviet diplomats worldwide, 
consisted of entries of official conversations routinely conducted 
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with foreign diplomats. Pestkovsky’s diary, however, did more 
than follow official instructions from the Commissariat. On the 
basis of his understanding of Mexico, a combination of what he 
had learned before his arrival and on his limited experience later, 
and of world events, with the Soviet Union placed at its center of 
it, he wrote about his numerous contacts with other diplomats and 
Mexican functionaries, and as someone who believed his interven-
tions would mold the world toward the Soviet regime’s supremacy 
while preserving peaceful coexistence (PESTKOWSKI, 1961).
Closest to his heart, however, were the topics of revolutionary 
propaganda and organization. His life was entwined with the party, 
and with counseling the Mexican communists. He provided gener-
ous funds to finance the Mexican Communist Party´s newspaper, 
as well as a combative organ of the Anti-Imperialist League. The 
newspapers that Pestkovsky subsidized criticized not only “Yankee 
imperialism,” but also the labor confederation, the Confederación 
Regional Obrera de México, CROM, supported by the government 
mostly because of its subservience to the government and to the 
US Federation of Labor.  It was not long before the Confederation 
became wary of the Soviets in Mexico, having  witnessed how the 
one union whose control it coveted, the railway syndicate, was 
gradually falling under the sway of the communists, guided politi-
cally and supported financially by the Soviet embassy.
The CROM leaders began a campaign to pressure Calles into 
moving beyond rhetoric. They wanted him to expel Pestkovsky 
from Mexico.  CROM’s primary complaint was the Communists’ 
growing influence in the railway confederation. This was under-
scored in 1925 when it created a rival organization of railway 
workers, which few workers joined.  Although the railway work-
ers had been ignoring the CROM, they opposed President Calles’s 
attempts to reorganize the railway company.  One of Calles’s 
economic goals was to initiate the company´s economic rehabili-
tation.  Damaged during the revolution and by subsequent rebel-
lions, the railway was further weighed down by debts and unre-
solved labor conflicts.  Calles’s plan to restore the company began 
with his attempt to reorganize its budget. A detailed study had 
shown that while in 1909 the company’s profits were at 41%, in 
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1926 they had fallen to 6%, and that while in 1910 the average sala-
ry had been 56.13 pesos a month, in 1927 it had risen to 124.78, an 
increase of 225%.  The government wanted to return the railways 
to private ownership to unburden itself of an enormous debt.  The 
deal did not go through, however, because a condition of purchase 
by the prospective buyer was to reduce the number of workers and 
decrease their salaries.  The government would not agree to this 
for political reasons.  Instead, the railways came under the control 
of the Ministry of Communications, and the workers became 
federal employees, barred from striking.  The new administra-
tion implemented an adjustment of salaries and manpower, but 
in June 1926 the railroad mechanics laid down their tools anyway, 
and the company promptly laid them off. The CROM president, 
and Minister of Industry, Labor and Commerce, Luis Morones, 
pronounced the strike illegal, bringing in scabs and troops to break 
it up.  The Soviet Embassy had supported the railway workers in 
their resistance to the reorganization of the company, as well as 
the workers’ motion to go on strike, and arranged for a provision 
of fifty thousand rubles (US$25,000) for the workers, to be sent by 
the Soviet Union’s Railway Workers.
The money reached its destination in March 1927.  It enabled 
the workers to move to new, safer and more spacious headquar-
ters, which provided a haven for families who could no longer pay 
their rents because of the strike.  The funds also helped support a 
soup kitchen and financed publication of an information bulletin 
for as long as the money lasted.  Once the funds dried up, the 
workers were forced to evacuate the building and economic hard-
ship weakened the strike.  One-by-one, the workers went back to 
work, convinced that they could not fight both the company and 
the government.  The strike was finally defeated in the spring of 
1927 (BARRIOS, 1978).
It was the Mexican Communist Party, however, that consumed 
most of Pestkovsky´s energy.  The party suffered from internal divi-
sions.  Each faction vied for leadership of the Central Committee, 
and Pestkovsky´s involvement in its affairs added to an already 
polarized organization. The differences between one faction and 
another manifested themselves in the perennial problem relative 
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to the party’s existence, and lack of a social base. While contact 
with labor and peasant organizations gave the communist leaders 
political authority, the struggle for ascendance over the popular 
movements was at the core of its fragmentation and internal strife. 
The importance of workers was by far outweighed by that of the 
peasants. Their movement for land had enormous political signifi-
cance, not only because of sheer numbers, but also because of 
their explosive resistance to the power of the landholders, foreign 
interests, and therefore, in theory at least, to imperialism. it is no 
wonder, then, that the party sought to bring the peasants under its 
control.  Despite the fact that the peasant leagues had been affili-
ated with the Peasant International, one branch of the Comintern, 
since 1923, the peasants and their leaders were more interested in 
securing land than in engaging in political activities unrelated to 
their immediate goals.
 In view of his activities, trouble was not long in coming for the 
Soviet Ambassador. The first salvo was launched despite the fact 
that Pestkovsky had nothing to do with its putative cause.  The 
occasion was the Soviet Commissar Chicherin’s speech in Moscow 
to the Party Central Committee in March 1925.  Assessing the state 
of foreign relations in the context of the United States’ denial of 
recognition of the Soviet Union, Chicherin remarked:  
We have succeeded in reestablishing diplo-
matic relations with a neighbor of the United 
States, Mexico, which gives us a political base 
on the new continent.  The Mexican govern-
ment is based on the rightist trade unions and 
the petty bourgeoisie.  The Soviet Republics 
are extraordinarily popular in Mexico.  Our 
plenipotentiary representative, comrade 
Pestkovsky, met with the most enthusiastic 
reception in Mexico, constantly experiencing 
the most friendly, enthusiastic attitude toward 
the Soviet Republic.  Mexico gives us a very 
convenient base for the further extension of 
our ties in America (CLISSOLD, 1970, p. 87).2
2  Vadillo to SRE, Moscow, 30 April 1925, ASRE, 18-22-86; “Intemperancias 
Bolshevistas,” Excélsior, 5 May 1925; “Las Declaraciones del C. Presidente se 
Han Recibido Bien” by Arthur Mackel, 6 May 1925; “El Ministro de la Rusia Roja 
Dió Explicaciones Ayer a Nuestro Gobierno,”8 May 1925, Excélsior; Weddell to 
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Chicherin’s observation came at a sensitive time, coinciding 
with the US ambassador’s notes of protest to the Mexican govern-
ment after the administration had intensified the process of agrari-
an reform. The leading Mexican newspaper interpreted Chicherin’s 
speech as Soviet Russia’s attempt to use Mexico as the operational 
base for its Bolshevik propaganda in the United States and Latin 
American countries.    
Undeterred by the trouble caused by Chicherin´s speech, 
Pestkovsky continued his work of radicalizing Mexican politics. 
When he learned of a military uprising planned for mid-1925, he 
naively believed that the moment of truth had arrived and that one 
wing of the military, the supposed left, should be separated from 
the supposed right wing, not understanding that what was really 
at stake were conflicts among military factions, and that whoever 
rebelled against the government was seen as subverting a consti-
tutional order, and would be court-marshaled.  This was indeed 
what happened every time during the 1920s that a military uprising 
took place.
The Soviet Embassy also became a lighthouse for Latin 
American revolutionary opposition to dictatorial regimes support-
ed by the United States.  The Cubans were opposed to Gerardo 
Machado, for example. The Venezuelans opposed the presidency 
of Juan Vicente Gomez.  At the time, the Venezuelan opposition 
was preparing the overthrow of Gomez, and needed arms and 
the means to transport them to Venezuela. While, according to 
Pestkovsky, the government of Mexico promised the arms, the 
insurrectionists asked the Soviet ambassador for a ship, or at least 
US$7,000 to rent one. Pestkovsky promised to inquire with his 
government about the possibilities of such assistance. 
 Pestkovsky left Mexico in the fall of 1926, ostensibly on his 
own initiative. Most likely, however, the Mexican president had 
asked him to leave before he was to be expelled.  The CROM, which 
feared a rivalry with the communists that would include organized 
Secretary of State, Mexico City, 11 February 1925, reel 83, 812.00/27508
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workers then under its umbrella, was pleased with Pestkovsky’s 
departure, and hoped that Calles would break off relations with 
the Soviet Union.  Despite CROM’s insistence, however, the presi-
dent maintained Mexico’s relations with the Soviet Union.  The US 
Department of State also favored Pestkovsky’s expulsion, hoping 
that this would be cause for Mexico’s severing relations with 
Moscow (KRAUZE; MEYER; REYES, 1981). However, as long as 
the US continued to pressure Mexico to refrain from implementing 
constitutional reforms, the Mexican government was conscious 
that breaking relations with the Soviet Union would convince the 
North Americans that the pressure they exerted was producing the 
intended result.  Such pressure would weaken Mexico’s sense of 
independent maneuvering in the international arena, the prime 
reason for which those relations had been established.  It would 
also alienate Calles’s allies at home, mostly comprised of the more 
reformist elite in the government, as well as the factions within the 
radical labor movement which believed that Calles was their kind 
of president.  
 
4 THE THIRD STAGE
It was into these unsettling circumstances that the new ambas-
sador, Alexandra Kollontai, arrived. She was preceded by her fame 
as a feminist, condemned by the Soviet Communist Party for her 
“bourgeois ideology,” apparently primarily because it failed to iden-
tify the institution of private property as the foundation of gender 
inequality, which only a unified effort of both men and women was 
thought to be able to resolve. Kollontai believed that the emancipa-
tion of women workers would not take place without a revolution-
ary struggle, but pointed out that women had specific needs due to 
the bonds of tradition. Even formulated in this fashion, her ideas 
were rejected by the males of the party, who argued that women 
should join in the general revolutionary struggle. They character-
ized her social theory as differing from the objectives of socialist 
construction. After Lenin named her Commissar for Social Welfare, 
Kollontai drafted several bills mandating government support for 
maternity care in coordination with other commissariats, and 
Daniela SpenSer
92  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 13, n. 25, p. 77-98, 2016
authored several laws that established women´s political and legal 
equality. In addition, she led a campaign to draw women out of 
the home and into activities and political posts. In 1922, Kollontai 
left her domestic posts, and Soviet Russia, after playing a leading 
role in the defense of trade union freedom, workers control of the 
factories, and party democracy.  From then on, she spent her time 
in the diplomatic service, and writing. She would have preferred to 
leave government service, live in France and write her memoirs, 
but the party opposed this. A diplomatic career was the only alter-
native open to her if she did not want to join the ranks of Russian 
émigrés (CLEMENTS, 1979).
Several weeks before sailing to Mexico in the fall of 1926, she 
told the press that diplomats should abstain from carrying out 
propaganda or interfering in the internal affairs of the host coun-
try. She was unpleasantly surprised when, on her arrival at the port 
of Veracruz in December 1926, local communist workers gathered 
to welcome her. She refused to address them and invited only a 
small delegation to her hotel. On her arrival in Mexico City, there 
were throngs of people waiting at the railway station with banners 
that read “viva Rusia soviética”, “viva la compañera Kollontai”. 
She thought the demonstration inappropriate, and waited in her 
compartment until they all left (ORTIZ, 2012).
Kollontai´s fame as a feminist brought her more trouble than 
satisfaction in Mexico.  She was accused of amoral behavior, 
and of desiring only to sow the seeds of communism in Mexico 
and Latin America. She was smeared by a pirated edition of her 
short story, “Bolshiaia liubov” (“A great love”), published under the 
sensationalist title “Red Love.” Originally published in 1923, the 
story was part of a collection entitled Women at the Turning Point, 
and was based on the author’s experiences.  The story told of a 
woman who sought self-realization through her work, over and 
against her husband’s opinion. The writer used a sentimental and 
romantic plot to popularize her theories regarding female eman-
cipation and women´s liberation from bourgeois morality. Despite 
her efforts to stop the publication, the story came out as a cheap 
and sensational romance. 
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However, it was of great significance that at a public ceremo-
ny a woman was accredited as an ambassador, and, moreover, 
one representing the Soviet Union. In her daily routine, however, 
Kollontai moderated her contacts with Communist Party members 
who visited the embassy, far too often in her view, as she noted 
in her diary. She did not think much of them: they tended from 
her perspective toward anarcho-syndicalism or reformism; some 
of them, she thought, were clear-headed, but most were merely 
enthusiastic, manifesting little or no understanding of the theoreti-
cal foundations of Marxism and communism. Their admiration for 
Lenin was boundless. She would have liked to be in closer contact 
with women, but felt constrained by the role she was assigned to 
play.  
The attacks on her by the local and international press were 
disheartening and together with the altitude of the city, drained 
her energy. By March 1927 Kollontai resolved to leave Mexico. She 
left in June. Before her departure the weavers sent her a sarape, a 
warm blanket, with her initials.  Another group of artisans brought 
her a coconut shell with the following engraved message: “Para la 
camarada Kollontai. Los imperialistas te odian, los revoluciona-
rios te quieren. Viva en nuestros corazones la amistad de México 
y Rusia” (“the imperialists hate you, the revolutionaries love you, 
long live in our hearts the friendship between Mexico and Russia”). 
Despite her irritation with the hostility toward the Soviet Union, 
she later recalled her arrival and the welcome she received from 
the workers waving red flags. She felt those workers to be her 
comrades, and remained hopeful and firm in her belief that those 
workers would eventually obliterate the parasitic bourgeoisie 
(ORTIZ, 2012).
5 IN CONCLUSION
Mikhail Borodin, Stanislav Pestkovsky and Alexandra Kollontai 
believed that their revolution was superior to the Mexican 
Revolution. However, the encounters of the three with Mexico 
taught them that the Communist International could not correct-
ly formulate a program for world revolution while leaving the 
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proletariat of the non-European countries, subjugated as they 
were by imperialism, outside of its sphere of action. They each 
saw the importance of the peasantry as agents of change in the 
“semi-colonial” countries like China and Mexico.
While Borodin´s stay in Mexico in 1919 was an exploration of 
unchartered territory, and one which yielded some striking results, 
his mission to China from 1923 to 1927 represented an anticipated 
‘’Eastern Route’’ to world revolution. In sum, he identified similar 
historically grounded elements at play in the two countries: an end 
to old regimes, that of Porfirio Díaz in Mexico in 1910, and the 
Chíng dynasty in China in 1911, as well as a power vacuum filled 
by warring factions in Mexico, and by the provincial warlords in 
China. The appearance of strong enough nationalist leaders capa-
ble of bringing warring factions under their direction, Venustiano 
Carranza in Mexico, and Sun Yat-sen in China, were thought to 
have led these two countries, at least, to some semblance of social 
democratic republicanism.  
What role did Borodin´s previous revolutionary activities in 
the United States, Mexico and Great Britain, his charismatic 
personality, his dynamism as an organizer and as a shrewd strat-
egist play in Stalin´s decision to appoint him as a political advi-
sor to Sun Yat-sen?  Employing the same resolve which he had 
applied in Mexico, but on a larger scale, Borodin reorganized the 
Chinese nationalists along the lines of the Russian model, and 
helped to promote the communists to key positions in the party, 
the Kuomintang. Under Borodin’s direction, moreover, Bolshevik 
advisers established the Whampoa Military Academy. While its 
commander was Chiang Kai-shek, the guiding hand on the staff 
was a Soviet general. The Nationalist Party´s program and statutes, 
and its agitprop art, left its Soviet imprint. When in 1927 Beijing 
authorities raided a Soviet compound and found a large cache of 
documents, the documents revealed Soviet involvement in a plan 
to overthrow the government. As we know, the commander in 
chief of the nationalist party, Chiang Kai-shek, ordered a purge of 
communist influence in its ranks, and Borodin fled China in haste. 
After his return to the Soviet Union, Borodin worked as editor of the 
English language Moscow News, the foreign language newspaper 
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that focused upon propaganda, principally regarding Soviet life 
and achievements.  He was arrested in 1949 during a period of 
anti-Semitic repression,  and died two years later in Lefortovo pris-
on (CHANG; HALLIDAY, 2005).
Pestkovsky also had to make a hasty retreat from Mexico 
after his involvement in the labor movement, which opposed the 
government´s measures to streamline the railway labor union. 
Neither the flow of the Mexican revolution nor its international 
concerns could withstand the meddling of a Bolshevik in its inter-
nal affairs. But Pestkovsky was driven by his sense of duty, and 
probably his sense of his own importance. Despite his long revo-
lutionary underground credentials, dating from before the October 
revolution and including arrests, expulsion, and exile, it appears 
that he did not take the necessary precautions to protect himself 
from the myriad of intelligence agencies which had mushroomed 
after the outbreak of the WWI (KATZ, 1981). 
Upon his return to Moscow, Pestkovsky was assigned to work 
in the Comintern, and put pen to paper about Mexico. He authored 
a series of articles for Soviet journals, as well as two major stud-
ies, A History of the Mexican Revolutions and The Agrarian Question 
and the Peasant Movement in Mexico.  Studying Mexican history in 
the context of his view that history was an explanatory chapter to 
politics enabled him to identify the internally generated social and 
political agents of change writ large, and to avoid propagandiz-
ing assertions such as: that the masses were inherently rebellious, 
and that their revolutionary potential could only be realized if their 
reformist leaders could be replaced by communist leaders.  After 
his experience, Pestkovsky did not perceive the government’s alli-
ance with the proletariat and peasantry as sheer opportunism. He 
viewed it as resulting from the emergence of the popular classes in 
the political arena, with the peasant movement at its centre. Were 
to follow the Soviet model, Mexico would need to work toward a 
labor-peasant alliance.  Peasants, after all, had been the revolu-
tionary force there.3 
3  A. Vol’skii, “Agrarnyi vopros i krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v Meksike,” Na 
agrarnom fronte, no. 2 (February 1927), 46-59.
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Even though Pestkovsky presented a more subtle and analyti-
cal explanation of the Mexican Revolution, his ideologically-tinged 
articles about Mexico dominated the Stalinist Comintern press, and 
portrayed Mexico as the hapless victim of US imperialism, forced 
either to succumb to, or to participate in, a proletarian revolution. 
In addition to writing about the Mexican revolution and the agrar-
ian movement, Pestkovsky was a middle level bureaucrat in the 
Peasant International, in the Agrarian Institute, in the Anglo-US 
and the Latin American lander secretariats, and in Lenin’s School 
for cadres.  In all those positions he tried to defend the specificity 
of Mexico without departing from Marxist orthodoxy. 
However, the economic crisis that erupted in 1929 confirmed 
and strengthened the Bolsheviks’ conviction that a capitalist crisis 
was the “midwife of the world revolution.” When agriculture in 
the Soviet Union was undergoing a process of collectivization and 
the abolition of private ownership of land, ideologists could not 
concede that the organized agraristas had a progressive role in 
Mexico. The Mexican Communist Party, which had collaborated 
with them, was also condemned because it failed to appreciate, 
as had Pestkovsky, that the agrarian regime had not left the stage 
of the feudal mode of production. This interpretation of Mexico’s 
evolution subordinated the Mexican Revolution to a Soviet teleo-
logical interpretation of history in which the country was no more 
than a link in the chain of events on a world scale. In 1930, as 
in the early 1920s, Mexico had to fit into this chain of universal 
history, and this meant not only an intellectual regress, but in 
taking the political high ground, the Soviet Union had slighted the 
Mexicans, leading to the breakdown of diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union, and banning of the Mexican Communist Party. It 
took decades for the reestablishment of relations between the two 
countries, and for the emergence of an intellectual understanding 
of each other´s revolution.
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